Covert approach- what you gain and what you lose

Yesterday’s blog addressed the overt presence of protection. those details that have a clear and present security detail around a principal.  I discussed the inferences that are applied to a noticeable footprint.  The main inference is that it is designed to deter.  However, we all are aware that having an overt footprint has NOT stopped an attack.  One of the issues I was remiss in bringing up yesterday is this; an overt footprint draws attention to a principal, who otherwise is not known. I also wrote about what you lose or what can be gleaned from a target study from having this footprint:

  1. number of security team present during principal’s movements
  2. determine how vigilant the security team is
  3. obvious vulnerabilities in security measures by watching the team operate
  4. determine if the security team conducts surveillance detection while working

Now that I have you concerned let me speak to the covert or as most people say “Blending in” approach to protection.  Unlike the overt approach, this covert approach is designed to be less obvious, thus bring less attention to the principal.  If, during the target selection, the adversary already knows who they are targeting, the covert approach could hurt you.  During the target study process of the adversary if there is no obvious security element, it could escalate the attack sequence into an ultimate attack.  Doing protection in a covert manner entails behaving and operating in a manner that does not scream, ” I am doing protection.”  This masquerade is difficult to manage and still effectively operate at the highest levels.  This is a very daunting task for inexperienced specialists.  Just as everyone can not be an undercover operative, the same is true for covert protection.  You are trying to hide in plain site while performing “head on a swivel” principles.  NOT easy.

A covert approach allows the specialist to easily perform surveillance detection while blending in.  An adversary who is unaware of security is more likely to expose himself under these conditions than he/she would when a security presence is known.  Between the 2 approaches a confrontation is more likely when under the covert approach.\

Remember, in an overt approach the adversary can determine the experience of the team and vulnerabilities.  In a overt approach it appears vulnerable and even though the adversary can not study the team, the team needs to be more experienced.



  1. No Chow

    II have a comment, but I’m going to wait to see where you take us tomorrow. My guess is that if I’m thinking it, you’re already 5 steps ahead of me.

  2. Direct MBBS Admission

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  3. Leon S. Adams

    Good stuff as always, Eric. Class in session as usual.

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