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When the threat goes up pt-2

Yesterday I blogged about whether many or most of the specialists in the US are adequately trained, equipped, or ready to actually work a high threat detail.  So that there is no misunderstanding regarding my use of the word hgh threat I am not referring to the environment in which you are working, but rather a legitimate threat on your principal.  9 out of 10 resumes or bios that are sent out have an entry stating that they are trained for high threat protection.  That is a standard bullet point on a resume/bio and their sound bite when you speak to the average specialist.

Today I will direct the same conversation towards companies.  It is also a standard operation in most companies to state that they are proficient in high threat protection.  To the average client this sentence is mostly glossed over.  The fact of the matter is this, many companies are not set up nor capable of managing the intelligence gathering and vetting process necessary for a high threat detail.

Gathering intel from a client and not fully investigating the source and possible contiguous realtionships to the threat is like thinking that the pies that were thrown at Bill Gates only come from bakeries.  Intelligence gathering, deciphering imtelligence and putting it in a format that can be translated to actionable and valid information is best served by companies that handle that as a primary business.  An average protection specialist is light years from an intelligence analyst and the reverse is normally true as well.

I am not talking about a threat and vulnerability assessment here.  I am talking about taking raw data supplied by the client as a threat and fully analyzing it, charting the information and translating that into a working document that can be used for the protection protocols.  For instance, when I was an analyst for HIDTA I would on occasion receive a report that only had a vehicle tag number.  As I went through my process that simple tag number would evolve into a 10+ page report with I-2 charts full of pertinent information that was workable for the Feds on the ground.  The other advantage I had was that I knew from personal experience working in an undercover capacity what information was pertinent versus what was not.

If a company has a working relationship with a group that can effectively analyze information or intel it does not mean that the deliverable is in a format that is security oriented.  That’s when the security provider has to have personnel that can translate the intel into the protective cutlure.  This is the nexus of my blog today.

This is not an attack but a wake up call before you get that call.  Don’t set yourself up for failure.

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